Chapter 56 Land System

The following is another important part of this meeting, everyone.

You must also know the situation of the empire. The damage to the empire caused by the Celali Rebellion more than a hundred years ago (some provincial governors wanted to fight against the central government with the support of landless farmers and urban unemployed groups) was unbearable.

Such a situation must never happen again today.

For this reason, I hope that you can hand over the control of the Timar and Zammit (both are grassroots administrative units of the Ottoman Empire) as soon as possible.

As for the support of the relevant troops, the empire no longer needs a large number of local armed forces, and the professional army will be the main force of the empire.

After hearing this, the officials talked a lot, but most of the voices finally became smaller.

Only a few voices were still muttering.

"It has been like this for hundreds of years."

"The laws of the ancestors cannot be changed."

"If you reform recklessly, the empire will perish."

"No sultan will take these without compensation."

Listening to the whispers of the group of people below, Selim's smiling face showed a hint of sarcasm.

He said lightly.

"Have you forgotten who owns these lands?"

The Sultan was still smiling, but he gave people an extremely dangerous feeling.

After hearing the Sultan's words, the officials below were completely silent, because from a legal point of view, these lands were indeed not theirs.

This has to mention one of the few political achievements of the Ottoman Empire, namely the nationalization of land.

Before talking about this issue, we must first understand the social form of the Ottoman Empire.

In fact, the Ottoman Empire was mainly an agricultural society, with farmers and herdsmen constituting the majority of the population.

There are many ways for farmers to organize, some are very small couples, relying on a pair of cattle to cultivate a small piece of arable land, and some are large clans, collectively cultivating adjacent land.

These farmers are tenants or self-employed farmers, and most of them are distributed in the Balkans.

But not every part of the Ottoman Empire is like this. In the eastern mountainous areas of Anatolia, there is still serfdom.

This is the Ottoman Empire. Let's not talk about it first. The diversity is indeed very diverse.

The question is, why do so many farmers support the Celari rebellion?

This is due to fluctuations in population due to poor harvests or political instability.

Therefore, the lack of labor and the displacement of farmers are common themes in the rural economy.

Back to the point, in order to avoid the disorder caused by landless farmers wandering around.

The land system of the Ottoman Empire was consolidated in the 16th century with the integration of laws by Ottoman jurists.

It defined most arable land as state land, strictly limited private ownership to urban properties, orchards in and around cities, and properties related to charitable institutions were called waqfs, accounting for about 15% of all arable land.

According to this reform that began in the 16th century, farmers on state land were hereditary tenants who could freely organize production and transfer land to heirs or others.

However, in this order, the beneficiaries were not the state, let alone landlords or fiefdom owners.

Rather, it was the salaried officials or contractors who collected these surpluses.

Salaried officials collected taxes in the province in the form of money, in kind, or labor from the administrative units of varying sizes assigned to them, the timar and zamit.

In return for military service, they participated in military campaigns under the command of the provincial governor, along with their retinues, which led to excessive local power.

As officials or contractors of the holders of the timar and zamit, they usually had administrative and taxing power over a village and its cultivated land and farms.

But their administrative and security powers did not include judicial power, which was in the hands of qadi (judges) appointed by the ulema.

In the 16th century, the holders of the timar and zamit maintained large local cavalry units, the famous sipahi cavalry.

These units would be mobilized in a strictly hierarchical manner for seasonal military campaigns.

However, throughout the 17th century, these units were marginalized in combat due to changes in military technology.

This change favored infantry equipped with muskets rather than horse archers with swords.

By the 18th century, holders of timar and zamit did not disappear, but became absentee landowners or leaders of reinforcements, providing logistical services to the imperial army in times of war.

They often outsourced the taxation and jurisdiction of their units to middlemen.

The imperial governors were of varying ranks and served short terms, often traveling from province to province with their families and armed retinues.

Their taxes were usually collected by their agents from their stipends, the so-called khas, rural or urban units scattered across the provinces they governed.

The centrally appointed governors were one of the main pillars of administrative integration in the Ottoman Empire, while the centrally appointed kadi was the representative of justice.

In times of war, armed groups of peasants and urban residents were called sekban, commanded by local military leaders, and fought to be included in the governor's retinue.

Although the distinction between sekban and banditry was often unclear at the local level, sekban became a profession for many young men who hoped to make a career in the army.

In the 18th century, provincial strongmen would rally the sekban around them to compete for imperial posts, first as lieutenant governor and then gradually as governor general.

This is also a major feature of the Ottoman Empire, local opposition to the central government.

In addition to these fiefs held by provincial military elites.

The royal family members and central elites of the Ottoman Empire can hold income units in name only by virtue of their status or origin, without providing any services.

These imperial dignitaries manage the units and communities under their names through agents and local contractors.

So Selim's envisioned reform actually requires the abolition of his own "imperial farm".

Similar to Timar and Zammit, the agricultural units owned by the imperial waqf are spread throughout the empire. The management of the waqf usually operates these units and collects taxes through local contractors and subcontractors.

In addition, in various regions, some units are defined as independent urban or rural tax areas, including mines, workshops and customs.

The state either outsources the short-term tax collection rights of these areas to contractors, or directly manages them through paid supervisors.

The contractors collect taxes in these enterprises and remit money to the state or the original holders according to the total amount agreed in the contract, and the rest is profit.

Like other early modern regimes, the Ottoman Empire had limited central government revenue.

Most of the surplus collected in the name of the state was either spent on local military or administrative needs, or taken away by officials as salaries for their military-administrative duties and contractors as their profits.

This is also one of the reasons why the Ottoman Empire was declining.

The land had been nationalized in the form of law, but there was no effective administrative agency. If the Ottoman Empire didn't die, who would die?